We examine the effects of socioeconomic and political factors on the distribution of conditional cash transfer (CCT) (Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)) in Indonesia.
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Empirical evidence suggests that politicization of social assistance program occurs in countries like Mexico [8, 19] , Brazil [13, 26, 27] , Turkey [1] and Colombia [2] . Schady (2000) showed a significant increase in social assistance spending (FONCODES) before the national election year. Other empirical evidence suggest the effect of political criteria to CCT programs. The CCT programs will increase the incumbent's vote in the presidential election [8, 27] . Aytaç (2014) examined the distribution of CCT program in Turkey using socioeconomic and political factors. It showed that setting of multiparty competition presents incentives to the incumbent party to channel disproportionately more resources to the districts with an ideologically close challenger. In contrast to empirical evidence of political criteria in CCT, Corrêa (2015) shows that the investment in CCT programs is not associated with incumbents vote swing. Fried (2012) shows that the distribution of the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil is not influenced by political criteria.
Evidence about political budget cycles (PBCs) were also found in Indonesia. Sjahrir, Kis-Katos and Schulze (2013) find significant PBCs for Indonesian districts' direct elections and it was stronger if the incumbent runs for reelection. Politician may use discretionary spending such as social protection programs to favor their position. Member of the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (BPK), Rizal Djalil stated that the allocation of social assistance spending in the state budget (APBN)/local government budget (APBD) is designed for the interests of the authorities, both in terms of political ambitions and personal interest, with a mode of social-assistance spending that increased significantly ahead of the election.
As social-protection program that have been popularly adopted in many countries, Indonesia also has CCT program called Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) . In this article, we want to examine whether the political criteria are affecting the distribution of CCT.
We focus on PKH for the following reason. First, PKH is the social protection program with CCT mechanism that was created in 2007. Both beneficiaries and allocation of PKH have increasingly from this program is created until 2015. Especially in 2013, the distribution of CCT to local government had significant increase from the previous year.
Second, PKH is the national-level program that can be categorized as best-practice implementation of social protection [3] . Impact evaluation conducted by World Bank (2011) show that PKH is an effective program to improve the social welfare and has a positive effect to increase the use of health services for beneficiaries. However, in the education sector, PKH has a little effect to improve education for beneficiaries.
This shows the effectiveness of CCT in Indonesia as a social protection program is not yet optimal. The impact and effectiveness of CCT can also be seen from the trend DOI 
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Political budget cycle (PBC) and pork barrel spending
Since 2004, national elections in Indonesia have been carried out directly, both the presidential and legislative elections. The implementation of the direct election will provide a greater tendency for candidates to conduct money politics to the public.
Political parties that have power in the government will be attempted to maintain their power by manipulating government resources. The phenomenon of PBC arises from a perception that politicians will use their power to 'manipulate' the budget ahead of elections in terms of policy, spending or deficits to increase the chance of reelection or maintaining his power in government. Nordhaus (1975) [9, 14] . In contrast, the core district hypothesis holds that material benefits should be directed toward the strongholds of the politician [6] . Both models explain the politician's strategy to win the election competition by distributing public spending to specific groups aimed to influencing voters [6, 9, 14] .
In voting-behavior model, Downs (1957) explains that in a democratic system, political parties will formulate policies for the interest in elections. Social programs such
as CCT is interesting to analyze because of the possible linkages between povertyalleviation programs and the political interests of certain groups. CCT politicization has been widely studied such as CCT in Peru/FONCODES [17] , Brazil/Bolsa Familia [13, 27] , Meksiko/Progresa [8] , Colombia/Familias en Acción [2, 16] 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) in Indonesia
CCT programs offer countries a new way to tackle poverty and prevent the transmission of poverty to future generations [25] . The CCT program provides regular cash payment to poor families, so that the beneficiaries can access basic needs such as education and health [1, 25] . Indonesia has implemented a CCT program called PKH.
PKH is a CCT program that provides quarterly cash transfers to very poor households in Indonesia by requiring education and health provisions for recipients [25] .
The beneficiary should meet at least one of the three required conditions, that is,
(1) households with pregnant and/or lactating women, (2) with a budget of 6.5 billion rupiah [22] . In 2016, PKH coverage increased by 42 percent from the previous year to 6 million beneficiaries.
Socioeconomic or political factors?
A study about the impact evaluation of CCT as a social protection program has been widely used to determine the effectiveness of CCT programs in tackling poverty. Based The massive increase in the number of countries adopting CCT as an effort to cope with poverty the research on CCT not only lets us know its effectiveness but also the impact of CCT on electoral performance. Poverty and politics have an interesting relationship to study. In this study, we try to show whether the distribution of CCT in Indonesia is influenced by socioeconomic or political factors.
As explained earlier, the main goal of CCT is to tackle poverty. Beneficiaries of PKH are very poor households with the welfare rank of 7 percent the lowest. Hence, we argue that the poverty rate is positively associated with the distribution of PKH. Aytaç PKH is an effort to build social protection system to the poor in order to maintain and improve social welfare of the poor as well as efforts to combating the poverty. To achieve the goals, beneficiaries are expected to be able to access health and education sector. HDI explains how people can access the development outcomes in obtaining income, health, education and so on. Two-third component in HDI formula are generated through access of health and education. Hence, we argue that HDI is negatively associated with the distribution of PKH. This is because the higher HDI of a region indicates that the region has a high quality of human resources so that the government will provide smaller CCT allocation. Aytaç (2014) shows that HDI has a negative relationship with CCT allocation.
The last socioeconomic factor is the social expenditure. Local governments with larger social spending such as subsidies, social assistance and grants indicate that the region has a great capacity to maintain the welfare of its citizen through the implementation of local government social programs. Veiga and Veiga (2013) show the grant expenditure transfers in the previous year (t-1) negatively associated with the allocation of grant spending during the election year. Hence, the authors argue that social spending in the previous year (t-1) is negatively associated to the distribution of PKH.
In a government institution, political factors cannot be ruled out from the policymaking process because both the president and the legislature are both elected through a political process of election. The existence of moral hazard to maintain its power in the government, the interests of certain groups and lobbying in policymaking are the causes of politicians using government resources for their personal interests, rather than for the welfare of the society [18] . Schady (2000) shows that the president-vote shares had a positive effect on the distribution of CCT in Peru, which can be interpreted as that the politicians will allocate larger CCT to region that consists the core voters. President-vote shares represent the extent of public support to the president candidate in the national election. We argue that president-vote share is positively associated with the distribution of PKH. The president elected from the previous election will attempt to maintain his authority or his political-party's position in the government. Politicians will influence voters by using social programs like CCT.
It is because CCT beneficiaries will have a preference for choosing an incumbent candidate [2, 8, 26] .
The second political factor is a political constellation showing the political relationship between central government and the local government. The ruling party in the legislation will have a preference for allocating resources (CCT) to the region with a strong political constellation aimed to maintaining the power of its political party in the region. Veiga and Veiga (2013) show that the similarity of political parties in the central and local governments has a positive effect on the allocation of grant expenditure.
The last political factor is competitiveness. In a region with high competitiveness, elected presidents in previous election will allocate greater CCT as an effort to maintain authority by influencing voters' behavior. Schady (2000) uses the marginality vote shares to measure the level of political competition. The study shows that CCT allocation is directed to the region with high marginal political effect. The higher political competition of a region, the more resources (CCT) will be provided to the region by the politicians, which is shown by an increase in political competition leading to an increase in CCT allocation of 13 percent [17] .
Methodology
For the empirical analysis, we use the panel data on 335 local governments from Table 2 presents the estimates of the effect of socioeconomic and political factors on CCT per capita. Column 1 presents the results of socioeconomic factor regression on CCT per capita. By using only socioeconomic factors, it shows that CCT program is a program that has an important role in the function of redistribution. This is indicated by negative association of HDI and social expenditure. These two socioeconomic variables support our argument that governments will distribute larger CCT to region with less human-resource quality and to regions that have low capacity in local social protection. However, the result of the socioeconomic variables, namely, percentage poor shows the opposite direction to our argument in developing the hypothesis, although statistically significant.
Findings
In column 2, we add three variables to determine the influence of political factors on CCT per capita, namely, president vote share, political constellation and competitiveness. The socioeconomic variables show the same result with column 1 and political factor indicates that vote share and competitiveness are positively associated with CCT per capita. The results indicate that politicians will provide greater resources to ICIFEB means that political competition in this region is more stringent than before.
In contrast with vote share and competitiveness, political constellation is insignificant. This may be due to the voter's view of the division of political parties' power to avoid the dominant political parties. Indonesia has experience related to the dominant political parties for about three decades. Based on these experiences, voters are more concerned with these views in shaping election behavior. In this study, we also found evidence that CCT programs cannot perform redistribution functions optimally. This is indicated by the fact that all socioeconomic variables are insignificant. It does not support Schady (2000) and Aytaç (2014) that shows that the CCT program is a program with a redistribution function.
To check the robustness of the results to a change in the estimation method, we also estimated the regressions with interaction term among variables (see Appendix 1). In general, result of robust check, only HDI and percentage poor show the consistent result as an explanatory variable. While the others are inconsistent, which indicates thus that variables are latent that can be improved.
Conclusion
Using the data of CCT allocations in Indonesia between 2013 and 2015, we found evidence that CCT budget distributions are more influenced by political factors than 
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